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Governmental Acquiescence in Private Party Searches:
The State Action Inquiry and Lessons From the Federal
Circuits
Eugene L. Shapiro'
ABSTRACT

In an area characterized by a significant potential for
governmental abuse, judicial examination of whether
governmental acquiescence in a specific private party search
constitutes state action, consequently subject to Fourth
Amendment constraints, has often lacked appropriatefocus and
depth. An examination of the standards used among the federal
circuits reveals prevalent approaches which identify the
circumstances bearing upon the matter, but which address them
under "multi-factored"totality of the circumstances standards.
The result has too often been a lack of specificity in discussing
the issues and a failure to provide needed clarity for law
enforcement.
This article examines the analyses among the circuits.It then
suggests a restructured inquiry that employs a rebuttable
presumption that evidence should be suppressedif there has been
sufficient police encouragement to search. Consistent with state
action analysis in other contexts, the suggested approach would
emphasize the importance of a central focus upon the nature of
the governmental encouragement. It would also retain past
productive judicial observations concerning the countervailing
significance of independent private motivations, facilitate a
detailed examination of the relevant issues, and address other
shortcomings of the currentapproaches.
INTRODUCTION

Seldom has the need for clarity in delineating the contours of state action-"the
dividing line between the public sector, which is controlled by the Constitution,

' Professor of Law, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, The University of Memphis. The author
wishes to thank Johannah O'Malley and C. Benjamin Lewis for their assistance during the preparation
of this article.
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and the private sector, which is not"2-seemed more evident than in the area of
search and seizure. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,3 the Supreme
Court affirmed the familiar principle that "[a]lthough the Fourth Amendment does
not apply to a search or seizure, even an arbitrary one, effected by a private party on
his own initiative, the Amendment protects against such intrusions if the private
party acted as an instrument or agent of the Government."4 In light of the critical
nature of this threshold issue and the enormous potential for abusive governmental
instigation of private searches, one would anticipate that appellate courts would be
able to develop sufficiently focused standards for determining whether
governmental encouragement of a private party search requires a finding of state
action. The Supreme Court has offered its view of the appropriate inquiry. In
Skinner,the Court continued, "Whether a private party should be deemed an agent
or instrument of the Government for Fourth Amendment purposes necessarily
turns on the degree of the Government's participation in the private party's
activities, a question that can only be resolved 'in light of all the circumstances.'" 5
The Court thus called for a focus upon the nature and extent of the governmental
activity, necessarily informed by the context within which it occurs.
This examination of the extent of the government's involvement, which
implicitly regarded as inapplicable that strand of state action analysis which could
find that a "public function" performed by a private party, may be subject to
constitutional constraints. It is reasonable to conclude that this approach in the area
of search and seizure has been foreclosed by the Court's requirement in Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co.,6 that under this doctrine only the exercise by a private
party of "powers traditionallyexclusively reserved to the State"7 would result in
constitutional applicability.' Thus, to use the phrase in Skinner, an examination of
2 Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 503,504 (1985).

' Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
4 Id. at 614; see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984) ("This Court has ...
consistently construed this protection as proscribing only governmental action; it is wholly inapplicable
,to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent
of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any government official.'" (quoting Walter
v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))).
s Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971))
(citations omitted).
6 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
8 The application of public function analysis to specific categories of private actors has, however, at
times been urged in the literature. See John M. Burkoff, Not So Private Searches and the Constitution,
66 CORNELL L. REV. 627, 657 (1981) (arguing that private police who engage in searches are often
"cloaked with the authority of the state" by virtue of their licenses, badges, and uniforms); Jim Michael
Hansen, The ProfessionalBondsman: A State Action Analysis, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 595, 596 (1981)
(examining "whether section 1983 claims are cognizable against bondsmen and their agents"); Adalgiza
A. NiUiez, Note, Civilian Border Patrols: Activists, Vigilantes, or Agents of the Government?, 60
RUTGERS L. REV. 797, 798 (2008) (arguing that "civilian border patrol groups . . . are absorbing
responsibilities that are exclusively reserved for the federal government" ).
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the "degree... of the Government's participation" in a private search falls within
the realm of the Court's state action analysis, which looks to the state's actual
involvement.9
To the extent that the area of search and seizure requires clarity in providing
guidelines to law enforcement personnel,10 the judicial analysis of governmental
involvement in private searches should be structured so that conceptions of
improper practices occupy center stage. Unfortunately, an examination of the
standards articulated among the federal courts of appeal reveals that efforts to
consider potential circumstances that can bear upon a search have developed into
prevalent "multi-factored" approaches, which have often failed to retain the
primacy of an examination of the state's actions."1 These totality of the
circumstances approaches in fact often provide a disincentive to focus upon the
nature and significance of governmental action in sufficient detail. Holdings have
at times rested upon a congruence of factors, seemingly providing insufficient
guidance for consistent judicial implementation of policy at the trial level. These
insufficiently guided lower court conclusions are frequently affirmed under a
deferential standard of review, 2 and, perhaps most importantly, the multi-factored

' Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614 ("Whether a private party should be deemed an agent or instrument of
the Government for Fourth Amendment purposes necessarily turns on the degree of the Government's
participation in the private party's activities."). While the examination of state action in the area of
private party searches has this focus, in other contexts there has been a tremendous amount of variation
concerning the nature of the state activity required. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614, 622 (1991) (holding that in a civil action, a private litigant's decision to exercise peremptory
challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race did constitute state action because of "significant
participation of the government" in maintaining the peremptory challenge system); Jackson, 419 U.S. at
357 (explaining that state's approval of utility's requested procedure for terminating service for
nonpayment was insufficient because the regulating Commission "ha[d] not put its own weight on the
side of the proposed practice by ordering it"); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177-79
(1972) (holding that granting a liquor license to a racially discriminatory private dub was insufficient
government involvement); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724-25 (1961) (holding
that a financially interdependent 'symbiotic relationship" between the Parking Authority and a racially
discriminating tenant coffee shop was sufficient to establish state action).
Indeed, it has long been asserted by many commentators that the Court's application of the
doctrine has lacked consistency. See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 505 ("For twenty years, scholars
persuasively argued that the concept of state action never could be rationally or consistently applied.").
1" See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001) ("Courts attempting to strike a
reasonable Fourth Amendment balance ... credit the government's side with an essential interest in
readily administrable rules."); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 772 (1983) (stating that a Fourth
Amendment standard 'should be workable for application by rank-and-file, trained police officers.").
" See, eg,, United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788 (9 h Cir. 1981); United States v. Steiger, 318
F.3d 1039 (11th Cir.).
12See, e.g., United States v. Silva, 554 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2009) ('Although Silva makes multiple
arguments about inferences the lower court could have drawn from the evidence, he has failed to shown
[sic] the court's conclusions were clearly erroneous."); United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734, 739 (7th
Cir. 1987) ("We will disturb the district court's findings of fact only if clearly erroneous."); United States
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approach provides an unnecessary reduction in clarity for law enforcement. Insofar
as deliberate police misconduct is concerned, this consequence could only have the
effect of increasing the frequency of improper governmental instigation of searches
which are believed by the police to be constitutionally immunized. Among these,
one abusive practice that certainly warrants its own attention is the problem of the
proverbial "wink and a nod," in which police make an explicit reference to a private
party concerning his or her ability to search free of constitutional constraints. 3
It is the thesis of this article that the provision of sufficient notice to law
enforcement concerning the parameters of impermissible police instigation and
encouragement should constitute a principal value to be served by judicial analysis,
and that the prevalence among the circuits of a multi-factored, totality of the
circumstances approach is neither necessary nor sufficiently instructive. This
commentary will begin by attempting to advance the discussion in the area by
taking a closer look at the analyses by the federal circuits and by exploring the
considerations that the courts of appeal have highlighted. It will then suggest a
more appropriate structuring of judicial analysis, which will emphasize the
significance of an examination of the state's activity. Finally, it will set forth the
author's view as to why the suggested, more structured inquiry is consistent with
settled state action doctrine and beneficial in avoiding some of the problems
presented by the circuits' prevalent totality of the circumstances approach.
I. THE APPROACHES AMONG THE CIRCUITS
In the 1981 decision of United States v. Walther, 4 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit approached the issue of governmental responsibility for private party
searches with a methodology that has served as the foundation for the analysis in a
large majority of the federal circuits. While many of Walthers observations have
been refined or modified by its progeny over the years, its basic analysis,
emphasizing the examination of common yet non-exclusive "factors" bearing upon
the issue, has widely commended itself to other courts of appeal.
In Walther, a Western Airlines employee, Hank Rivard, while working in the
baggage terminal, observed a woman's overnight case that had been shipped as a
"Speed Pak-""5 Rivard shook the case and found it to be suspicious because it was
light, did not rattle, and was taped shut. 16 Upon opening the case, Rivard "found
that it contained a white powder substance." 7 Rivard contacted an agent of the
v. Lambert, 771 F.2d 83, 89 (6th Cir. 1985) ("The district court's evidentiary rulings must be upheld on
appeal unless they are dearly erroneous.").
13 For a judicial recognition of this sort of abusive practice, see United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d
339, 343 (4th Cir. 2003).
14United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981).
" Id. at 790.
16Id.
7

' 1d.
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Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), who confirmed after a field test that
the substance was cocaine.' 8 The cocaine was replaced with sugar, the package was
resealed, and when Walther arrived to claim it she was arrested in the parking
20
garage. 9 The arrest led to the seizure of other evidence from her purse and car,
and she and the package shipper were charged with possession of cocaine and other
offenses.

21

The events surrounding Rivard's contact with Walther's case were "not Rivard's
first contact with the DEA."22 He had been a DEA confidential informant
between 1973 and 1977.23 Rivard had been given an informant number, and was
paid principally for information concerning individuals fitting a "drug profile" on at
least eleven occasions. 24While his informant's file had been dosed in 1979 when he
was on leave from the airline, Rivard had not been informed of that fact. 21 At
Walther's suppression hearing, Rivard testified that he had discovered illegal drugs
in Speed Paks in the past. 26 '[T]he DEA had never discouraged him" from opening
such packages, and he also testified that while he did not expect payment for
notifying the DEA of the contents of Walther's case, he also had no reason not to
expect it.27 A DEA agent testified that Rivard would have been paid had he
28
discovered a "significant amount of drugs."
"[T]he district court found that at the time Rivard opened the Speed Pak, he
was acting as 'an instrument or agent' of the DEA."29 It also "found that in opening
the Speed Pak Rivard was not carrying out a business purpose of his employer, his
sole reason being his suspicion that the case contained illegal drugs."" It concluded
that it was probable that Rivard opened the case with the expectation of
compensation if a significant quantity of drugs was discovered, and suppressed all
3
evidence obtained as a result of the search. 1

1

SId.

19Id.

2 Id.
21 Id.
2Id.

23Id.
24 Id.

5Id.

2 Id.
27 Id.
2
8Id.
29
3 Id. at 791.

0Id.

31 Id. On the same basis, the evidence was suppressed in the shipper's case, and the appeals were

consolidated. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit found that the district court's ruling was proper. It noted
that "where a private party acts as an 'instrument or agent' of the state in effecting a
search or seizure, fourth amendment interests are implicated.""
This court has recognized that there exists a "gray area" between
the extremes of overt governmental participation in a search and
the complete absence of such participation. The resolution of
cases falling within the "gray area" can best be resolved on a caseby-case basis with the consistent application of certain general
33
principles.

The Ninth Circuit noted that de minimus or incidental contact between a
citizen and law enforcement is insufficient to transform a private citizen into a state
agent, and stated that "[t]he government must be involved either directly as a
participant or indirectly as an encourager of the private citizen's actions ... 34 The
court added that "[t]he requisite degree of governmental participation involves
some degree of knowledge and acquiescence in the search."35 Citing cases where a
telephone company had statutory authorization to monitor its own lines for
unauthorized use and where a bank had been required to report crime, the court
further observed that "[m]ere governmental authorization of a particular type of
private search in the absence of more active participation or encouragement [would
be] similarly insufficient" to implicate the Fourth Amendment.36
The court stated that a private party's "legitimate independent motivation for
conducting the search" was significant, especially where "law enforcement officers.
. .do not take an active role in encouraging or assisting an otherwise private party
search."37 It added,
It is clear from the foregoing that two of the critical factors in the
"instrument or agent" analysis are: (1) the government's
knowledge and acquiescence, and (2) the intent of the party
performing the search. These are the factors which have
generated most of the controversy on this appeal and which now
occupy our attention.38
32 Id.

33Id. (citation omitted).

Id.

34

"sId. at 792. The court also noted that a wide variety of situations involving these principles existed,
observing that, as an example, a federal anti-hijacking program might be considered a governmental
search if
an airline employee's activity fell within the federal guidelines. Id.
36Id. (citing United States v. Goldstein, 532 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Stevens,
601 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1979)).
37Id.
38Id.
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With regard to the standard of review of the district court's findings, the court
stated that the ruling below was "proper under any standard."39 It added that
Rivard had stated "that the only reason why he opened the case was his suspicion
that it contained illegal drugs. Thus, legitimate business considerations such as
prevention of fraudulent loss claims were not a factor."' ° He had an expectation of
probable1 reward, and thus had "the requisite mental state of an 'instrument or
agent.'

4

The court also saw proof of the government's acquiescence in the DEA's prior
contact with Rivard. While the government had no previous knowledge of this
specific examination and had not "directly" encouraged it, it had "certainly
encouraged [him] to engage in this type of search."42 He had opened such packages
before, and "[t]he DEA thus had knowledge of a particular pattern of search
activity dealing with a specific category of cargo, and had acquiesced in such
activity."4' In its conclusion, the court "emphasize[d] the narrowness" of its
holding.' "We merely hold that the government cannot knowingly acquiesce in
and encourage directly or indirectly a private citizen to engage in activity which it is
prohibited from pursuing where that citizen has no motivation other than the
45
expectation of reward for his or her efforts."
Most of the circuits employing a multi-factored approach use the two specific
"critical factors" identified by the Walther court as a starting point for their
discussion. Although after Walther the Ninth Circuit did not immediately revisit
the issue of a private party's independent business motivation, it soon continued to
examine the general question of a private party's purpose. In United States v.
Miller, 6 decided less than two years after Walther, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that under Waltheis approach, the victim of a theft was a private actor after he
"4 7
entered upon the defendant's land "out of a desire to recover his stolen property.
The court reached this conclusion despite the government's express concession that
it "knew of and acquiesced in [the victim's] conduct."4" The victim, Nandor
Szombathy, who lived in Spokane, Washington, had received an anonymous tip
that his stolen low-boy trailer and three conveyor belts were on defendant's

'9

Id. at 791.

40Id. at 792.

41See id.

42Id. at 793.
4 Id.

"Id.
45Id.
47

United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 657.

4Id.
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property in Superior, Montana.49 He notified the FBI, who in turn advised the
local sheriffs office in Superior." °A deputy confirmed that Miller had "a low-boy
with a 'for sale' sign on it parked next to the frontage road running to Miller's
property." S1 Both the FBI and the sheriff were unable to confirm that the trailer
was the stolen one, and they then invited Szombathy to view it. 2 While driving to
Superior, he saw two trailers marked "for sale" near the frontage road and although
he thought one "might have been his," he "was not sure." 5 3 When he met with the
law enforcement officers, he asked if "he could go to Miller's property" posing "as a
prospective buyer."5 4 The FBI agent said "that he 'didn't see anything wrong with
that at all.'"55
When Szombathy arrived at the property he looked at the trailers near the road
and then, with the consent of defendant's teenage son, he looked at other trailers in
Miller's shop area.16 He recognized his stolen trailer there despite an alteration in
its appearance, and later acknowledged that his trailer had not been visible from the
road." In another area, Szombathy also saw the three stolen conveyors. 8s When
Szombathy reported his observations to the sheriff and the FBI agent, the latter
suggested that they obtain a search warrant.5 9 The court stated, "Szombathy
decided that, in the meantime, he would go back to Miller's property and
photograph the stolen equipment. [The FBI agent] objected to this idea," thinking
this might alert the defendant.6" Szombathy proceeded, and the agent "followed
him for protective purposes, positioning himself where he could watch Szombathy
with binoculars."61 Szombathy entered the property and, with the knowledge of
defendant's son, again viewed the items and, on this occasion, took pictures. 62 A
search warrant was later issued based upon Szombathy's observations, and when it
was executed the stolen property was not on the premises. 6 Defendant was
indicted for receiving and concealing the trailer, and he moved to suppress the
64
evidence obtained as a result of Szombathys visits.

'9 See id. at 655.
so Id.
51 Id.

S2Id.
53

Id.

54 Id.
55

Id.

56

Id.

57 Id.

Id.The conveyors had not been visible from the road either. Id.
Id.at 655-56.
60Id.at 656.
51

59

61 Id.
62

See id.

63Id.
64Id.
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The district court declined to find that Szombathy had acted as an instrument
of the government, and the Court of Appeals agreed.65 Concluding that Szombathy
had acted out of a private motivation, the court expressly declined the government's
invitation to conclude its analysis on this basis. 66 Instead, it proceeded to address
the government's involvement during the sequence of events. 6 The court noted
that Szombathy's actions did not become governmental conduct at the time of his
initial articulation of his plan, "when the officers gave tacit approval to [his] plan to
visit and gain access to Miller's property." 68 It stated that "Szombathy had not
proposed to do anything illegal," and the court reiterated that the visit had been
Szombathy's idea. 69 Moreover, on the second visit, when Szombathy returned to
take pictures accompanied by the FBI agent who remained off of the property, the
agent had followed him "primarily out of a concern for [Szombathy's] safety, not
out of any desire to reap the benefits of a private search."7' Consequently,
Szombathy had acted in a private capacity.7
The discussion in Miller is striking in exhibiting a characteristic that the use of
the "multi-factored" Walther approach can involve. The Millercourt had expressly
eschewed the government's invitation to conclude its analysis after it found that
Szombathy's intention to recover his property was a private one. Instead, in
accordance with Walthers apparent directive, the Court of Appeals went on to
consider the nature of the government's acquiescence and activity. When
addressing the agent's express endorsement of Szombathy's original plan, the
court's discussion, underlining the fact that the plan was formulated by Szombathy,
illustrates the influence of its "private purpose" analysis upon the question of
governmental encouragement. Even more telling was the court's surprising
conclusion that the FBI agent's actual participation during the second visit was
insufficient to associate the government with the entry because the agent's
motivation was to provide protection seems inexplicable without the explanation
that the private motivation colored the analysis. Certainly Miller presents the
possibility that, as a "factor" to be considered among others, a private party's
independent motivation can influence a court's view of the nature of the
government's involvement.
In 1994, when discussing its decision in Miller, the Ninth Circuit later
attributed a more determinative importance to the two "critical" Waltherfactors. In

61See id. at 656, 658.
"Id. at 657.
67See id. at 657-58.
61Id. at 657.
69Id.
7

Id. at 658.
71Id. The court found, alternatively, that Miller's son had implicitly consented to Szombathy's
visits. Id. at 658-59.
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United States v. Reed,7 2 the court stated that in Miller "[t]he general principles for
determining whether a private individual is acting as a governmental instrument or
agent for Fourth Amendment purposes have been synthesized into a two part
test."" 3 As the standard to be employed in the Ninth Circuit, the court quoted the
language of Miller "(1) whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the
intrusive conduct; and (2) whether the party performing the search intended to
assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own ends."74 In Reed, which
involved a drug prosecution, the court concluded that a hotel employee's search of
76
5
the defendant's room was state action when police "stood guard"" as lookouts,
77
and the employee lacked an independent private motive for the search. The court
also observed that a sufficient private motivation must be independent of an
interest in preventing criminal activity. "[11f crime prevention could be an
independent private motive, searches by private parties would never trigger Fourth
Amendment protection and the second prong of the Miller test would be
79
meaningless."78 The court also added that "snooping" is not a legitimate motive.
°
Recently, in George v. Edholm, the Ninth Circuit concluded, in the context of a
§ 1983 action, that the conduct of a private physician who forcibly and without
consent removed a plastic baggie from a subject's rectum on the basis of
information provided by police may have engaged in a governmental search if the
police had falsely stated that the suspect had swallowed cocaine or suffered a
seizure.8 ' Under these circumstances, the doctor's medical motivation would not
have permitted the police to "avoid the requirements of the Fourth Amendment."82
As a reasonable jury could have so concluded, the motion for summary judgment
had been improperly granted. 3 The court emphasized that it held only "that [the
doctor's] actions could be attributed to the state," and did "not reach the different
question whether a jury could conclude that [the doctor] is himself liable under §
1983." s4
72United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 1994).
73

Id.
at 931.
7 Id. (quoting Miller,688 F.2d at 657).
7'Id. at 929.
Id.at 932.
IId. In response to the government's contention that the employee had entered the room to ensure
that it was not damaged, the court observed that he had admitted that he had no such motivation and
"[he] did not stop searching after he had learned the room was in good condition." Id. at 931.
" Id. at 932. Reed's conviction pursuant to his guilty plea was nevertheless sustained because of the
untainted evidence that formed a valid basis for the warrant. Id. at 929.
79Id. at 932.
'0George v. Edhoim, 752 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2014).
"' Id.at 1215-16.
82Id. at 1215.
" See id. at 1216.
14 Id. For a district court's application of the Ninth Circuit's criteria in the context
of a cruise ship
employee's search of a passenger's cabin and backpack after the death of his wife, see United States v.
McGill, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1248 (S.D. Cal. 2010), aft'd, 564 F. App'x 339 (9th Cir. 2014), cert.
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A number of circuits have either simply stated the "two factor" Walther-Mifler
standard or have done so with an express emphasis upon some consideration that
has also been part of the Ninth Circuit's discussions. In United States v. Steiger,8"
the Eleventh Circuit considered the gathering of computer evidence of child sexual
exploitation and possession of child pornography that was furnished to
Montgomery, Alabama police by an anonymous hacker abroad. 6 Setting forth the
two-pronged Walther-Millertest, 7 the court considered the use of the source's two
e-mails in supporting the issuance of a search warrant. It concluded that "the
record is clear that the source acted at all material times as a private individual ...
The information conveyed in those two e-mails was limited to that which the
source had acquired before making any contact with the [police department]." 8 In
United States v. Feffer, 9 the Seventh Circuit endorsed the district court's
employment of Wathers "two critical factors," adding that "[t]he court's analysis
must be made on a case-by-case basis and in light of all the circumstances." 90 The
court coupled its embrace of the standard with a mild admonition. In this tax fraud
case, the private party, Diane Langron, had been responsible for her employer's
accounts payable, accounts receivable, and purchasing. 91 She became concerned
when some transactions were not being reported on the company's books, and the
92
proceeds were being directed to the defendants.
At the subsequent suppression hearing, Langron testified that she had been
worried about her own responsibility for signing false documents and contacted the
IRS, at first anonymously and later identifying herself.93 Langron met with two
IRS agents, provided them with company documents, "and the agents, in turn, told
Langron about becoming a numbered informant and about the rewards for which
she could apply." 94 She also testified that she met with the agents several times
between December 1981 and March 1982. 91 The agent stated "that he had advised
denied, 135 S.Ct. 315 (mem.) (2014). According to the court, the FBI, by providing training in crime
prevention, "did not direct Carnival to search for and seize evidence implicating the Fourth
Amendment. Nor did the FBI acquiesce in such conduct." George, 752 F.3d at 1216.
'sUnited States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1045.
Id. The court stated, "For a private person to be considered an agent of the government, we look
I'
to two critical factors: (1) whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and
(2) whether the private actor's purpose was to assist law enforcement efforts rather than to further his
own ends." Id.
98Id.

89United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1987).
90Id. at 739.
9'Id. at 735.
92See id.
93Id.
9'Id. at 735-36.
9'Id. at 736. The agent estimated the number of meetings was between six and eight after their
initial conversation. Id.
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Langron at the first meeting that he could not encourage her to take any
96
documents, but that it was IRS policy to accept documents voluntarily provided."
He received additional documents at two meetings, and while he testified that he
had never asked Langron to produce additional documents, he "did admit coming
prepared to their second meeting, at Langron's home... with a microfilm copier in
his car."97 At that meeting, he received company cash reports, sales invoices,
statements, and correspondence.9" He also acknowledged that, after mentioning to
Langron that obtaining copies of tax returns was a "lengthy process," he received
copies of defendant Feffer's individual tax returns and other documents in the
99
mail.

In Feffer, the Seventh Circuit stated that it would disturb the district court's
findings of fact "only if dearly erroneous" and noted that the lower court had
"found that Langron's fear of being held liable for her part in the tax fraud
motivated her to assist the IRS."'O° As in Miller, the district court's conclusion
concerning Langron's private motivation proved to be dispositive.' The court's
language on this matter is perhaps the strongest acknowledgement among the
opinions of the Seventh Circuit of the importance of this factor and of the potential
for a multi-factored analysis to discourage a focused discussion of the parameters of
improper conduct. The court stated:
So while the agents may have come close to being too receptive
and too cooperative in dealing with Langron, the district court
did not err in refusing to exclude the fruits of Langron's search
once it determined that her search was purely private and not the
result of government misconduct .... By this we do not condone
the agents' conduct, however; and we remind the IRS and its
agents that attempts to circumvent the warrant requirements of
the fourth amendment through the use of a private party will not
be tolerated. °2
Subsequently, citing Feffer, the Seventh Circuit augmented the "two critical
factors" derived from the Walther-Miller test by stating that "[o]ther useful
indicators are whether the private actor performed the search at the request of the
government and whether the government offered a reward."'0 3
96 Id.

97Id.

9 Id.
99 Id.

Id. at 739.
See id. at 739-40.
Id. at 740.
153 United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 847 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that shipper was pursuing
its own business interests in safety and security); see also United States v. Ginglen, 467 F.3d 1071, 1075
'o"
192
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The Eighth Circuit similarly posed the express question of "whether the citizen
acted at the government's request." 4 The Fifth Circuit endorsed the Ninth
Circuit's Walther-Miller"two factor" approach in United States v. Bazan,'05 while
at the same time adding the following observations:
In sum, we hold that where the government has offered no form
of compensation to an informant, did not initiate the idea that he
would conduct a search, and lacked specific knowledge that the
informant intended a search, the informant does not
act as a
06
government agent when he enters another's property.
The Walther-Miller approach has continued to provide the basis for analysis in
that circuit,"0 7 although, inexplicably, one 1999 opinion referred to the issues
addressed in Bazan's "summarizing" remarks quoted above without reference to the
"two critical factors" specifically imported in Bazan from the Ninth Circuit.0 8 The
Second Circuit has stated in United States v. Knoll °9 that "it is 'immaterial'
whether the government originated the idea for a search or joined it while it was in
progress. The government may become a party to a search through nothing more
than tacit approval."" 0 Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
has only briefly referred to its unadorned "tacit approval" standard,'1 ' leaving it for

(7th Cir. 2006) (noting that defendant's sons' actions were "consistent with concerned sons attempting
to prevent a misguided father from engaging in continued destructive behavior" and the sons did not act
to obtain a reward); United States v. Crowley, 285 F.3d 553, 558-59 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that
police had not instructed shipper to open package and were surprised when shipper re-opened it).
104United States v. Inman, 558 F.3d 742, 745 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Smith, 383
F.3d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that the defendant's co-workers had acted "to satisfy their
curiosity" without law enforcement's knowledge)).
" United States v. Bazan, 807 F.2d 1200, 1203 (5th Cir. 1986).
1'0
Id. at 1204.
107 See, e.g., United States v. Blocker, 104 F.3d 720, 725-26 (5th Cit. 1997) (finding that the
examination of records was legitimate exercise of state administrative authority); United States v. Pierce,
893 F.2d 669, 673-74 (5th Cir. 1990) (concerning an airline pursuing private policy); United States v.
Kirk, 392 F. Supp. 2d 760, 765 (N.D. Miss. 2005) (finding that motives were personal).
sSee United States v. Dahlstrom, 180 F.3d 677, 682 (5th Cir. 1999).
109United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313 (2d Cir. 1994).
11 Id. at 1320 (quoting Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949) (plurality opinion)). In
Knoll, a bankruptcy fraud prosecution, the court remanded for a determination of whether files stolen
from defendant's office by a private party had been examined before the government "effectively
directed" the party to continue to look for more information. Id. In a subsequent opinion, it was
determined that the search had been completed "and Knoll's reasonable expectation of privacy in the
files had been defeated before any government involvement." United States v. Knoll, 116 F.3d 994, 998
(2d Cir. 1997).
"' See United States v. Wolfson, 160 F. App'x 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that the government
agent had tacitly approved of only a search of documents that he reasonably thought were in lawful
possession of private party).
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the district courts to construe its meaning. In United States v. Jarrett,12 the Fourth
Circuit stated that "[a]lthough we have never articulated a specific 'test,' we too
have embraced this two-factor approach, which we have compressed into '[o]ne
highly pertinent consideration,'" restated as "whether the government knew of and
acquiesced in the intrusive conduct and whether the private party's purpose for
conducting the search was to assist law enforcement efforts or to further her own
ends."" 3 The court also added that whether the requisite agency relationship exists
"is a 'fact-intensive inquiry that is guided by common law agency principles.""' 4 In
contrast, the Seventh Circuit has declined to "assert that the constitutional issue...
necessarily must be governed by the common law definition of agency."'
Among the circuits influenced by the Walther-Millermulti-factored approach,
the First Circuit, in United States v. Pervaz,n16 is noteworthy for its expression of
the view that an overarching articulation of a "test"' to determine state action would
not be helpful." 7 Nevertheless, while expressing such reservations, it simultaneously
set forth its own characterization of the multiple issues to be examined. In Pervaz,
it stated,

We think that any specific "standard" or "test" is likely to be
oversimplified or too general to be of help, and that all of the
factors mentioned by the other circuits may be pertinent in
different circumstances: the extent of the government's role in
instigating or participating in the search, its intent and the degree
of control it exercises over the search and the private party, and
the extent to which the private party aims primarily to help the
n
government or to serve its own interests.

In the First Circuit, these Pervaz factors have generally developed into a
template for analysis much in the same way as Waither-Milleis "critical factors"
have been used in other circuits. The First Circuit's addition of an inquiry into the
"degree of control" exercised by the government "over the search and the private
party" is similar to an issue later raised by the Fourth Circuit inJarrett.1"
In applying the Pervaz factors, the First Circuit has focused more heavily than
the other circuits upon the nature of the police conduct, but, as noted in its
112United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2003).
113Id. at 345 (quoting United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir. 2003)).
114

Id. at 344 (quoting Ellyson, 326 F.3d at 537).
United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 847-48 n.1 (7th Cir. 1988). Inexplicably, the Fourth
Circuit relied upon Koenig for its broad position. See Ellyson, 326 F.3d at 527. Ellyson is also cited in
the Jarrettdecision. Jarrett,338 F.3d at 344.
116 United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
".Id. at 6.
I's Id.
"'Jarrett,338 F.3d at 345.
"1
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standard, it simultaneously considers factors similar to those encountered by other
circuits. Pervazitself had noted that a search was private when it was undertaken by
a telephone company for the independent corporate purpose of determining
whether its customers were being defrauded.120 The court also found that there was
no evidence that a government agent had "authorized the search or even knew
about it."' 2 ' The First Circuit has had several opportunities to elaborate upon its
language in Pervaz. In United States v. Momoh,'22 the court stated that the term
"instigation" in Pervaz "properly means 'affirmative encouragement,' or
alternatively, 'coercing,' 'dominating,' or 'directing' an individual." 12 3 This language
appears to require an active level of encouragement that is also reflected in United
States v. Silva.'24 There, the First Circuit found that a detective had not
participated in a search of defendant's bedroom by his brother. 125 The court
expressly relied upon Pervais three factors,'126 adding that it "will not find state
action simply because the government has a stake in the outcome of a search." 2 7
Silva was convicted for conspiracy, identity theft, and drug and health care fraud
after he had forged prescriptions and had used fake identification to facilitate their
use.' 28 A search warrant had been issued, in part, based upon items obtained by the
brother, Norman, who had entered defendant's bedroom in search of traffic tickets
and bills that he believed defendant had accrued in his name.1 29 Incriminating
items were observed but not seized during Norman's first entry, and when he
informed the police he was asked to bring the items to the station. 30 The police
had wrongly assumed that Norman had taken the items when he first observed
them, and he then entered the room a second time for their seizure. 31 In addition
to finding that the detective neither participated in nor controlled the second
search, and indeed "did not tell Norman to search Silva's bedroom again because he
believed Norman already possessed the items," the court added that the "second
search was motivated by [Norman's] desire to clear his name; he returned to the
12
0 Pervaz, 118
121 Id.

12

123

F.3d at 6.

United States v. Momoh, 427 F.3d 137 (1st Cir. 2005).
Id. at 141 (citation omitted). In Momoh, a parcel delivery company was not "instigated" by its

desire to comply with Federal Aviation Administration regulations concerning the inspection of overseas
packages, and it was also likely that the company was motivated by a desire to refrain from carrying
contraband. Id. at 141-42; see also United States v. Boyd, 298 F. App'x 25, 26-27 (1st Cir. 2008)
(finding insufficient instigation where an officer merely asked the private party to "keep an eye out" for a
package and did not coerce, "or even ask that [he] seize or search the package on his own").
124United States v. Silva, 554 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2009).
125See id. at 18-19.
126Id. at 18.
127 Id.
2

Id. at 16.

129See id. at
130
Id.

Id.

131

17.
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station with only those items that were relevant to his concerns and that would
exonerate him."1 12 The court employed a clearly erroneous standard when reviewing
these findings by the district court.' 3 3
While Momoh's and Silva's readings of Pervaz focused on specific and active
governmental encouragement, an interesting unreported district court opinion,
United States v. Burgos Montes, xs4 decided in 2011, is also instructive on the
inquiry within the First Circuit concerning governmental acquiescence. The district
court, quoting Pervaz's observation "that 'any specific "standard" or "test" is likely to
be oversimplified or too general to be of help,'" declined to regard the three
enumerated Pervaz factors as representative of "all of the elements that must be
present or that may be relevant in a particular case." 35 Citing Walther, it observed,
"[e]ven though Silva's language implies active participation, there is a grey area
between overt Government participation and complete absence of participation
that should be resolved on a case-by-case basis."' 36 Burgos Montes indicates that
what the court there viewed as a more passive acquiescence by the government
seems to remain in play in determining state action within the circuit, at least to
some degree. There, the defendant had moved to suppress evidence obtained as a
result of a warrantless search of his house and vehicle by Semidey Morales.' 37
Before the search, Ms. Morales, who was staying in the defendant's home, 3 "
executed a Confidential Source Agreement with the DEA.139 The agreement was
provided to her in Spanish, and the English version provided in part, "I understand
that I may not, under any circumstances, participate in an act of violence; . . .
participate in any activity designed to obtain information by an unlawful method
(e.g., breaking and entering, illegal wiretapping, illegal opening of the mail,
trespass amounting to illegal search, etc)."' 4
At the suppression hearing, the DEA agent testified that that Semidey Morales
"read the document and signed it without asking any questions," and "that he did
not explain any part of the document to her nor did he explain what the
consequences of an unlawful search and seizure would be."' 4' The court added, "In
2

1' Id. at 19.
133See id.
134United States v. Burgos Montes, No. Crim 06-009 JAG, 2011 WL 1743420 (D.P.R. May 2,

2011).
...
Id. at *10 (quoting United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 1997)).
Id.(citing United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1981)).
137Id. at * 9. This motion to suppress was one of four motions before the court, and the defendant
had been indicted for narcotics trafficking, the importation of controlled substances, a count requiring
forfeiture, and the homicide of Semidey Morales. Id. at *1, *9. Potential punishment included the death
penalty. Id. at *1.
13 The court characterized Ms. Morales's presence in defendant's home by saying that she had
"practically moved [in]." Id. at *12.
...
Id. at *9, *12.
14 Id. at * 9.
41

1

Id.
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essence, his testimony was that she did not ask anything and he did not explain
anything because he assumed she understood the document fully."14 2 On cross
examination, he testified that he instructed her "to specifically gather financial
information, information on properties and telephone numbers of associates."143
Three days later, Ms. Morales provided several documents she had gathered from
defendant's house and car.'" The agent testified that Morales was then told that
"she could not bring in any more documents because they could be considered as
the product of an illegal acquirement." 4 5 The DEA retained those she had
obtained as evidence because "she had already brought them in.""4 Despite these
instructions, she then brought the DEA a copy of the defendant's contract through
which he had acquired his farm, and this was retained by the DEA as well.' The
court stated that
[w]hile there is no evidence to establish that the DEA overtly
instigated the warrantless seizure of the items in question, it was
established during the hearing that it specifically ordered
Semidey Morales to go out and get the evidence and that it knew
she would have complete access to Defendant's property.14
Acknowledging that she was motivated by reasons that included a fear of being
prosecuted and the receipt of monetary compensation, the court stated that "a
mechanical application" of the Pervaz factors "would not properly address all the
pertinent circumstances and ...are of little help here." 149 It stated,
In sum, because the DEA did not explain any part of the
Confidential Source Agreement and did not even take any
minimal precautionary measures to ensure that the person who
would be its eyes and ears within Defendant's home would not
also cross the line and seize the physical evidence they specifically
instructed her to seek, it deliberately turned its back to the more
than potential violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights. This is exactly the type of grey area case described in
Walther, where the Governments [sic] acquiescence amounted to
42

1

143

Id.

Id.

144
Id.at
145

*10.

Id.

146
Id.
141Id. "She told the agents that she had not taken the [contract]," but it had been given to her by

the defendant to photocopy. Id.
148Id. at *11.
149/Id.
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precisely the type of Government participation that triggers the
activation of the Fourth Amendment protection. xs
Finding that Semidey Morales was acting as a government agent, it added,
The Court will not endorse the DEA's use of the virtual "don't
ask don't tell policy" it employed in this case to sign up an
informant who practically moved into Defendant's home and
seized his personal property before the ink on the Confidential
Source Agreement was even dry. Doing so would imply that the
Court is willing to turn its back on this type of distressing
attitude on the part of law enforcement towards the Fourth
Amendment rights of citizens.'
In contrast with what might be termed the generalized totality of the
circumstances views of the other circuits, the two other courts of appeal that have
developed an overall methodology 5 2 have explored approaches that have imposed
an affirmative requirement that a private party must have intended to aid the
police. The developments within the Tenth and Sixth Circuits have been very
different from one another, however. While the Tenth Circuit continues to require
53
this prerequisite, the Sixth Circuit has recently retreated from such an approach.1
4
In the 2000 decision of United States v. Souza," the Tenth Circuit concluded
that a United Parcel Service employee's opening of a package constituted state
action prohibited under the Fourth Amendment,' applying the standard used
within the circuit:
In determining whether a search by a private person becomes a
government search, the following two-part inquiry is utilized: "1)
whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive
conduct, and 2) whether the party performing the search
IsO Id.

at *12.

Id.

.52
Neither the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit nor the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has done so. See, e.g., United States v. Parish, 468 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(stating that the court "need not explore" issue); Pecorella-Fabrizio v. Boheim, No. 3:08-cv-00348, 2011
WL 5834951, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2011) ("The Third Circuit has not articulated a standard for
assessing whether an individual acts privately or as an agent or instrument of the government."); United
States v. Jackson, 617 F. Supp. 2d 316, 325 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (stating the same).
153 Compare United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that both prongs
of
the two part inquiry "must be satisfied before the private search may be deemed a government search")
with United States v. Booker, 728 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that only an analysis of "the first
requirement" was necessary).

Souza, 223 F.3d 1197.

154

"' Id.at 1202.

2015-2016]

Governmental Acquiescence in Private
Party Searches

305

intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own
ends." Both prongs must be satisfied before the private search
may be deemed a government search. The totality of the
circumstances guides the court's determination as to whether the
15 6
two-part inquiry has been met.
In Souza, DEA agents were training officers on drug interdiction at a UPS
facility in Sacramento.157 A cardboard box attracted the attention of one of the
instructing agents, Detective Sloan, because of its heavily taped appearance, its
solidity, and the facts that the sender had used only his first name and had sent it
through a third party shipper."' 8 Detective Sloan suspected that it contained
contraband, and, because it could not be compressed, that it had been filled with a
type of foam that hardens after it is put in a box. 5 9 He removed it from the
conveyor belt and placed it next to the wall. 160 Another agent, Special Agent
Rowden, decided to subject it to a test by a narcotics dog and removed the package
from the building. The dog positively alerted to the package.' 6 1 Rowden returned
the package to Sloan and stated that he wanted the package to be held while he
obtained a warrant. 162 Detective Sloan placed the package next to a wall in the UPS
facility. 163 Afterwards, a UPS employee, April Denning, arrived and, according to
her testimony, "a conversation was initiated by Detective Sloan."1 64 Sloan "told her
that a narcotics dog had alerted to the box, and 'stated that they couldn't tell me to
open the package, they were not authorized to do that, they would have to get a
search warrant, but he pointed to where the package was.''

165

Minutes later,

another officer told Denning, "I cannot tell you to not open the package, but there
it is on the floor. "166 In her testimony, Denning stated "that she was influenced by
16
the statements. " 167 Sloan continued with his evaluation of other packages.

Approximately a minute or two after Detective Sloan continued
with his evaluation, Denning picked the targeted package up,
Id. at 1201 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 797

156

(10th1 Cir.
1989)).
7
1 Id. at 1199.
158 id.
59
1 Id.

160
See id.
161 Id. at 1200.
162
Id.
6

Id.

Id.

164

165
Id.
167

Id.

167
Id.

168
Id.
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took it a few feet away to where her work station was located, and
began opening the package. Detective Sloan watched Denning
open the package but did not tell her not to open it because he
felt it was "not his right to stop her." He also believed that she
was acting within UPS policy in opening the package.
Due to the hardened foam that completely encased everything,
Denning had difficulty opening the package. She started tearing
some of the foam away and, at that point, DEA agents
intervened using a knife to cut through the foam and located the
69
Tupperware container that was inside the package.1
The Tupperware contained a substance that was later identified as
methamphetamine' ° A search warrant was obtained for the addressee-defendant's
residence, and a controlled delivery was arranged. 7 1 Souza was arrested after the
delivery, and following his indictment for possession with intent to distribute and
aiding and abetting, he moved to suppress the drugs.172 The magistrate judge and
district court agreed that the search had violated the Fourth Amendment, but the
district court declined to suppress the evidence because a search warrant would have
73
resulted in its discovery.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the search was governmental and the Fourth
Amendment had been violated.17 4 It examined both prongs of its standard. The
court noted that the officers had specifically targeted the box and isolated it for
safekeeping, and then, "twice, within a span of five minutes, attempted to
encourage Denning to open the package."175 It observed that she had testified that
these statements had influenced her, and said that "there is no evidence that in this
instance Denning had a legitimate, independent motivation to open the package,
despite her practice of randomly opening packages on other occasions."1 76 It then
added that "[p]erhaps most damning of all is that . . . the officers substantially

assisted in the search initiated by Denning. " 117 While the court reached the
conclusion that "the Fourth Amendment would be seriously undermined if the
search of the package in this case was [sic] described as anything other than

169 Id.

0

17 Id.
171Id. at
172Id. at
-7Id. at

1200-01.
1199, 1201.
1201.

174
See id. at 1202.
175Id.
176Id.

177Id.
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orchestrated by the government,"178 it nevertheless agreed with the district court
that the inevitable discovery doctrine foreclosed suppression of the evidence.' 79
The Sixth Circuit's evolution of an affirmative requirement concerning a private
party's motivation is reflected in two 1985 opinions. The first, United States v.
180
Howard,
presented an analysis and conclusion that can properly be viewed as
straightforward Miller-Walther reasoning. Examining a search by an insurance
company investigator who was motivated by the independent intention to
determine the liability of the company, the court held that his cooperation with the
police and the government's knowledge and participation did not transform the
investigator into "an agent of the government."' 8' While reaching its conclusion,
the court quoted Walther's statement that "two of the critical factors in the
'instrument or agent' analysis are: (1) the government's knowledge or acquiescence,
and (2) the intent of the party performing the search." 182 Seven months later, in
United States v. Lambert,"s3 in the context of a drug prosecution, the court
considered the retrieval of items by a housekeeper who, after observing open drug

1

Id.

179Id. at 1205-06. With regard to the issue of inevitable discovery, the court concluded that Special

Agent Rowden had taken sufficient steps in preparation for a warrant application, and implied that it
had "a high level of confidence that the warrant in fact would have been issued." See id. at 1205-06.
In United States v. Poe, 556 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2009), employing Souza's criteria, the Tenth
Circuit rejected the argument that bounty hunters who had searched a residence were state actors. With
regard to the bounty hunters' motivation, the court stated,
Poe cannot establish Souza's second prong because the bounty hunters primarily
"intended ... to further [their] own ends'"-their financial stake in Poe's bailrather than to assist state officials. These bounty hunters were hired to apprehend
Poe by the bail bonds company, which was responsible for the bond it posted on
Poe's behalf . . . . Financial gain motivated these bounty hunters; they had
apprehended Poe and completed the search before calling the police. Indeed, they
"would have [conducted the search] even if the police had not responded to
[their] call." Because the bounty hunters did not intend to assist law enforcement,
they are not state actors under the second prong of Souza.
Id. at 1124 (citation omitted) (alterations in original). The court also specifically rejected the
argument that law enforcement and the bail bonds industry had developed a "symbiotic relationship"
which presumably would have been sufficient for a finding of state action by stating that Poe's
"argument that law enforcement and the bail bonds industry have a 'symbiotic relationship,' is
unpersuasive. We do not inquire if the police benefitted from the private conduct, but if the bounty
hunters had a 'legitimate, independent motivation' to conduct the search." Id. (citation omitted).
'" United States v. Howard, 752 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated on othergrounds, 770 F.2d 57
(6th Cir. 1985).
181 Id. at 227-28. The investigator testified during defendants' trial for conspiracy, mail fraud,
and
wire fraud. Id. at 222, 227. Despite expressly noting the government's participation, the court did not
discuss that factor at length. Id. at 227.
" Id. (quoting United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1981)).
.sUnited States v. Lambert, 771 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1985).
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use in the defendant's house, offered to serve as an FBI informant and received
payment for her expenses." 4 The court's conclusion, that she was not acting as a
government agent when she removed items from the house in light of the FBI's
express instruction not to do so,' 8 5 might well have rested upon a Miller-Walther
86
analysis. Instead, the court augmented its earlier discussion from Howard'
A person will not be acting as a police agent merely because there
was some antecedent contact between that person and the police.
Rather, two facts must be shown. First, the police must have
instigated, encouraged or participated in the search. Second, the
individual must have engaged in the search with the intent of
87
assisting the police in their investigative efforts.1

The Sixth Circuit's insistence upon a showing of a private individual's intent to
assist a police investigation was reiterated in 2008. In United States v. Hardin,'
the defendant had been sought by police following a petition to revoke his
supervised release.'8 9 Police received information that he might be staying at his
girlfriend's apartment and advised her apartment manager of his criminal history.
This included a "shootout" with police after an armed robbery that had served as a
basis for a conviction.' 9" In order to determine if the defendant was present, the
officers asked the manager "to go ahead and under a ruse check to see if a water
leak was in the apartment to see if he was there."' 9' The manager did so, saw the
defendant in the apartment, and informed the police.1 92 Believing the defendant to
be dangerous based upon his prior conviction, they entered the apartment and
handcuffed him.' 93 They found three firearms, drugs, and cash during a sweep of
the apartment, the defendant's pockets, and the couch on which the defendant had
been sitting. 194 Defendant, Hardin, was tried and convicted for possession of crack
cocaine with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm by a felon. 9 s Upon his motion to
suppress the physical evidence, he unsuccessfully argued that the apartment

114Id. at 86.

"6 Id. at 89.
..The Lambert decision explicitly references the Howardanalysis. Id. (citing Howard, 752 F.2d at
227).
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
'8 United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404 (6th Cir. 2008).
119Id.

at 407.

190Id.
191Id.

Id. at 407-08.

192

Id. at 408.

193

194
Id.

Id.at 406-07.

195

2015-2016]

Governmental Acquiescence in Private
Party Searches

309

manager had been an agent of the government. 196 The district court concluded that
the manager, "upon learning from law enforcement that the defendant may be in
one of the apartments, had an independent duty to investigate further and confirm
whether, in fact, [Hardin] was in the apartment."' 97 Responding to the
government's argument that the manager had an independent motivation to protect
the other apartment residents from harm, the Court of Appeals cited Howard for
its conclusion that there the insurance investigator had an "entirely independent""9 '
business motivation, and noted that here, "Prior to the officers' arrival and
conversation with him, the apartment manager had absolutely no intent to search
Apartment 48. Far from being 'entirely independent' of the government's intent,
the manager's intent to search Apartment 48 was wholly dependent on the
government's intent."199 Most significantly, in light of the Sixth Circuit's discussion
of Lambert in a subsequent opinion, the court then added that Lambert's two
requirements had "clearly" been satisfied."° "[T]he manager had an intent to assist
the officers with their effort to arrest and remove Hardin from the premises ...
[T]he manager was acting only to assist the officers . . . so that they could arrest
him." 20' The Lambert standard thus led to the conclusion that the manager was an
agent of the government.2

The Sixth Circuit has only recently eliminated its prerequisite that a private
party's intent to assist the police is necessary to a finding of state action. It did so
under circumstances in which the shortcomings of this requirement were evident,
and this development within the circuit appeared to suggest a judicial assessment of
the potentially secondary importance of an inquiry into a private party's motivation
when governmental encouragement or acquiescence is sufficiently substantial. In
United States v. Booker,2"s the defendant moved to suppress a five-ounce rock of
crack cocaine that had been retrieved from his rectum by an emergency room
physician. °4 Booker had been in the front passenger seat of a car that was stopped
by a K-9 officer for expired tags. 20 5 When the officer smelled marijuana, the driver,
who was defendant's brother, consented to a search of the vehicle. 2°6 Before doing
so, as the officer returned to his car to check on driver's license status and
outstanding warrants, he saw defendant "moving around, as if he was attempting to
196Id. at 409.

197Id.
19'Id. at 418 (quoting United States v. Howard, 752 F.2d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 1985)).
199

Id.

210Id. at 419.

201Id.

202See id. at

419-20.

20 United States v. Booker, 728 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2013).
2o4Id.
20

at 539-40.

Id. at 537.
m Id.
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conceal something."2 7 During the previous year, the officer had arrested the
defendant "and recovered thirteen bags of marijuana that Booker hid in his
crotch." 20 ' After the officer completed his checks, his trained drug-sniffing dog
alerted near the front passenger side door of the car where defendant was seated.20 9
He was asked to step out of the car, and while a pat-down produced no drugs the
officer noted that Booker "cl[e]nched his butt[ocks] together" when patted in that
area. 2 1 Large amounts of currency were in defendant's pockets, and a search of the
front passenger seat revealed one packet containing .06 grams of marijuana and two
packets containing "residue." 211 The officer also "noticed marijuana 'ground up into
the floor' of the passenger-side seat."2 12 While insufficient marijuana was recovered
to permit an arrest under state law, defendant was nevertheless arrested for felony
possession of marijuana. 21" He was handcuffed with his hands behind his back, and
21 4
was transported to the police station.
At the station, defendant was placed in an interview room and read his Miranda
rights, at which time an officer noticed that he was "fidget[ing] and try[ing] to put
his hands in the back of his pants."21 5 This prompted the officer to move the
handcuffs to Booker's front. 216 A short scuffle ensued after the police were out of
the room and Booker tried to bar their reentry, but another pat-down and search of
the room revealed no contraband. 217 Defendant was then transported to the
Anderson County Detention Facility in Clinton, Tennessee. An officer stated that
he "fidgeted" during the drive.21
"The detention facility did not have a policy of strip searching all new detainees,
and there [was] no indication whether Booker was going to be placed in the general
population of the facility."21 9 A sheriffs deputy stationed there agreed, however,
based on the officers' suspicions, "to strip search Booker to determine if he was
concealing contraband in his buttocks."220 During that search, the deputy stated
that he saw "a small string protruding from [Booker's] anus." 2 1 When asked about
that object, Booker attempted "to cover the area and tried to push the object
7

20
2

id.

M Id.

2o9Id.

Id.
Id.
212 Id.
210
211

41.

213

Id.

214

Id. Other officers were involved in this transportation and in subsequent events. See id. at 537-

215Id. at 538.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id.
2 19

Id.

Id.

22
221Id.
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further into his rectum." 222 Another altercation ensued, Booker was restrained, and
223
the deputy's supervisor ordered him to take Booker to a hospital.
At the beginning of its opinion, the Court of Appeals characterized this
transportation to an emergency room as grounded in reasonable suspicion "that
Booker had contraband hidden in his rectum." 224 Booker was taken to the hospital
while naked, "shackled[,] and covered only in a blanket because the officers did not
believe that there was sufficient time to get him dressed." 221 One officer, traveling
separately to the hospital, arrived before Booker and told the emergency room
physician, Dr. Michael LaPaglia, that he "strongly suspected that Booker had drugs
in his rectum." 226 Twice before during the preceding three years, officers had
brought suspects to LaPaglia "so that he could perform a digital rectal examination,
a procedure in which a physician inserts a finger into the patient's anus to probe
227
the rectum."
When Booker arrived, "still naked and handcuffed," he denied hiding drugs in
his rectum and refused to submit to the procedure.22 During the suppression
hearing, the doctor testified that he then "replied that Booker 'really did not have a
choice because if my suspicion was high enough to think that he had some sort of
dangerous substance in his rectum, then it was my duty to get it Out.'229
Throughout the suppression hearing, "LaPaglia reiterated that his 'duty' was
medical in nature."23" Following Booker's refusal, the doctor told him that "if
[Booker] did not cooperate [LaPaglia] would administer muscle relaxants or, if
necessary, paralyze Booker in order to perform the rectal examination." 231' LaPaglia
stated that Booker then gave consent to a rectal examination, but since none of the
other four witnesses so testified the Court of Appeals noted that the record did not
232
support a conclusion that informed consent was given.
Dr. LaPaglia attempted a digital rectal examination, but Booker contracted his
anal and rectal muscles and prevented it.233 Then
-..

LaPaglia ordered a nurse to inject muscle relaxants into Booker's
left buttock. On the second attempt, Booker remained
uncooperative and LaPaglia could not complete the examination,
t

Id.

"Id.

2 4 Id. at 537.
Id. at 538.
226Id.

227
Id.

22Id. at 539.
229
Id.
2

W

Id.

31Id.

See id.at 539, 541-42.

232

" Id. at 539.
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but he could feel a foreign object inside Booker's rectum,
convincing LaPaglia that completion of the rectal examination
was imperative. Finally, LaPaglia directed an emergency room
nurse.. . to administer a sedative and a paralytic agent to Booker
intravenously, and had him intubated to control his breathing. At
4:12 p.m., Booker was intubated. He remained intubated for
about an hour, unconscious for twenty to thirty minutes, and
paralyzed for seven to eight minutes. While Booker was
paralyzed, LaPaglia removed a rock of crack cocaine, greater than
five grams, from Booker's rectum. LaPaglia then turned over the
34
crack rock to Officer Steakley, who took it for evidence.1
Booker was indicted for one count of possession with intent to distribute more
than five grams of cocaine base, and following a hearing on his motion to suppress,
235
both the magistrate judge and the district court found the search constitutional.
The Court of Appeals found that Booker's Fourth Amendment rights had been
violated,2 36 noting that "[e]ven though the doctor may have acted for entirely
medical reasons, the unconsented procedure while Booker was under the control of
the police officers must, in the circumstances of this case, be attributed to the
state. "237 It added that "[t]he unconsented procedure, moreover, shocks the
conscience at least as much as the stomach pumping that the Supreme Court long
ago held to violate due process." 23s With regard to the "sufficiently close nexus" for
Fourth Amendment purposes between "the officers' participation, knowledge, and
custody" and LaPaglia's conduct to make it "attributable to the police," the court
observed,
When police officers bring a suspect in custody to a purportedly
independent actor, and stand by without interfering while the
actor unlawfully batters the subject in a way that the police dearly
could not, it can hardly be argued that resulting evidence is
admissible. In some circumstances this must be true no matter
2 39
what the intent of the independent actor.
4

23 Id. at
235Id. at

539-40.
540.

236Id.

"7 Id. at 537.

2

238Id.

IId. at 540. The court added,
LaPaglia must be treated as a government agent for Fourth Amendment purposes
because the suspect was in the physical control of the police, the police knew what
LaPaglia was going to do, the police knew that Booker did not consent, and a
reasonable police officer would know that the doctor did not, independent of
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The court concluded that "[i]n short, the police effectively used Dr. LaPaglia as
a tool to perform a search on Booker's person."2'" The court then addressed
Lambert's stated requirement that, in addition to the need for police instigation,
encouragement, or participation in a search, a private party "must have engaged 24in1
[a] search with the intent of assisting the police in their investigative efforts."
The court characterized that language as dictum, "entirely unnecessary to our
resolution of the Lambert case."242 It stated that in Lambert the "analysis of
whether the housekeeper was an agent focused entirely on the first requirement,
and conceded that the housekeeper had the intent of assisting the police." 24" Booker
thus appears to relegate the issue of a private party's motivation to the status of a
factor to be considered by the Sixth Circuit along with the degree of police
participation or encouragement. While, to be sure, the court's language and
Booker's facts may lend themselves to a future interpretation in which a private
individual's motivation would become immaterial only under circumstances of
extreme police instigation, the methodology of the Sixth Circuit in assessing state
action now appears to conform more closely with that of a majority of the federal
circuits.
I. TOWARDS RESTRUCTURING THE INQUIRY
The prevalent multi-factored approaches used within the federal circuits in
their determination of the basic issue of whether a search constitutes state action
are dearly designed to incorporate considerations that can bear upon the question
of whether relief is appropriate under such a claim. However seductive this totality
of the circumstances methodology might seem in its simultaneous consideration of
potentially important factors, it is problematical in failing to provide the most
appropriate avenue for a thorough judicial discussion of the nature of inappropriate
police encouragement. In the most frequent formulation among the circuits, the
hallmark of this approach has of course been the exploration of the government's

police direction, have the legal authority to intubate and paralyze the suspect
without his consent.
Id. at 541.
240Id. at 543.
241Id.
242Id.
243Id. Hardin was only briefly discussed in light of its resolution and a parallel factual consideration:
"Just as the landlord in Hardin could not enter the premises in the absence of an emergency under
Tennessee law, Dr. LaPaglia could not intubate and paralyze a conscious and competent Booker except
with consent under Tennessee law." Id. at 544.
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conduct along with the examination of the issue of the motivation of the private

2
party. 4

The issue of state action should initially be focused upon how the state has
acted. The matter of whether a remedy should be provided is a distinct issue, and,
as is evident in the current development of the Supreme Court's overall
exclusionary rule jurisprudence, that question may certainly be dispositive in a given
case.245 An examination of the private party's perspective quite properly belongs to
this latter inquiry, and calls for a thorough exploration in that context. The
prevalent approach of the circuits, in blurring the distinctions between these two
separate matters by means of a unitary test, has, at times, had the effect of stifling
the sort of extended discussion of the state's activity that seems warranted.
A more appropriate approach would be to require a sequential analysis,
involving an initial examination of whether a state actor has participated in,
instigated, or encouraged a private party's search. If so, any failure of the searching
party to comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment should
presumptively result in the suppression of the evidence obtained. Under this more
appropriate analysis, a suitable standard of proof should then be formulated for
determining whether the countervailing determinative circumstance of a private
party's independent purpose motivated the search and should preclude suppression.
This structured two-tiered approach, with its central inquiry into the state's
activity, would be consistent with the Court's overriding concern with the nature of
a state's participation in its other state action analyses. It would reduce the risk of a
private party's motivation improperly coloring the judicial assessment of the state's
actions, and it would strongly encourage a court to focus on each matter in depth.
A discussion of important elements in this suggested sequential inquiry is in order.
A. GovernmentalParticipation,Instigation, or Encouragement
The principle that a state's actualparticipation in a search or seizure presents a
cognizable Fourth Amendment issue, quite apart from any question involving a
private party's participation, is so axiomatic in Supreme Court doctrine that it
requires little attention. Thus, in 1921, in Burdeau v. McDowell,2 6 the Court
244Subsidiary factors in some formulations, such as whether a payment is offered by the government

or the degree of the government's control, may appropriately be characterized as bearing upon these
issues. See, e.g., United States v. Ginglen, 467 F.3d 1071, 1074 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that the
government's offer of a reward is a consideration); United States v. Shahid, 117 F.3d 322, 326 (7th Cir.
1997) (holding that the government lacked the ability to "control or induce[] decisions of mall security
officers").
24 See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006) (holding that an exclusionary remedy
was not appropriate for a violation of the knock and announce requirement); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.
340, 349-50 (1987) (holding that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable when officers reasonably rely
upon an apparently valid statute); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-19 (1984) (holding that the
exclusionary rule is inapplicable when officers reasonably rely upon an apparently valid search warrant).
24 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
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observed that "[t]he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches
and seizures, and

. . .

its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and

history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of
sovereign authority."247 The current use of a totality of circumstances approach has
even threatened this basic principle. In United States v. Souza,24' discussed above,
when a DEA agent used his own knife to assist a UPS employee in cutting through
hardened foam which encased contraband, 249 that very fact should have been
conclusive on the issue of sufficient state involvement and that inquiry should have
been at an end. Instead, the court considered the agent's
participation as a factor
25 °
which contributed to its finding of state participation.
On other occasions, the application of a totality of the circumstances approach
has also seemed to undermine the basic consequence of active governmental
participation, despite the fact that Walther had initially formulated its inquiry with
a focus on the "'gray area' between the extremes of overt governmental participation
in a search and the complete absence of such participation. "251 While these
subverting analyses concerning actual police participation are by no means the
norm, they have appeared with sufficient frequency to be of concern. In United
States v. Reed, 52 in an approach similar to Souza's, the Ninth Circuit reached its
conclusion that the police's standing guard as lookouts constituted sufficient
participation only after it considered whether the private party had an independent
motivation. 2 3 Most strikingly, as discussed above, the same Court of Appeals
concluded earlier in United States v. Mille?"s4 that an FBI agent's actual
participation as a lookout for a searching private party did not constitute state
action because it was motivated "primarily out of a concern for [the private party's]
safety" rather than "[a] desire to reap the benefits of a private search." 5 The court's
conclusion that a police lookout's concern for the safety of a principal actor
disassociates the officer from the searcher's activity for state action purposes was
astoundingly novel. As was suggested above, the Miller court's view of the
significance of the government's actual participation appears to have been
influenced by its conclusion that the searcher's motivation was a private one. Miller
therefore also illustrates the potential obfuscation of an appropriate examination of
the government's actual involvement under the prevalent unitary totality of the
circumstances approach.
247Id. at 475.

24 United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2000).
249Id. at 1200.

210
See id.at 1202.
251See United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added).
252United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 1994).
13 Id. at 929-32.
" United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982).
2"Id. at 658.
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As important as a court's characterization of actual governmental involvement
in a search may be, in the absence of such actual participation, a court's discussion
of the extent and consequences of particular acts of governmental encouragement
provides a critical opportunity for appellate guidance. The federal circuits have
considered a range of circumstances: whether the government instigated the idea of
the private party search, 256 the nature of the government's instructions to the
private party,257 whether the government offered the private party a reward, 251 and,
as reflected in Walther, whether the private party had an ongoing relationship with
the government which had encouraged

similar searches in the past.2 59 The

prevalent multi-factored analysis does not sufficiently direct the inquiry to a
focused exploration of the encouragement, however. The Seventh Circuit's vague
comment in United States v. Feffel 61 that government agents "may have come
close to being too receptive and too cooperative in dealing with [the informant]," 261
illustrates a missed opportunity for articulating police boundaries with clarity, and
was the direct result of the court's simultaneous discussion of the informant's
motivation. 262 One significant case among the circuits, United States v. Jarrett,261
stands out in highlighting one of the most problematical issues concerning
governmental instigation-that is, a situation in which the police make an overt
statement or reference to a private party about that person's ability to search free of
constitutional constraints. 264 The question of whether such a reference constitutes
non-explicit, but in fact mutually understood, police encouragement of the search
has under current analyses remained subject to the individual assessment of a
reviewing court. In Jarrett,the Fourth Circuit characterized an instance of such a
"proverbial 'wink and a nod,' ' 265 and while the court's holding may appropriately be
criticized on other grounds, its frank identification of the practice does prompt a
critical assessment of whether the problem it presents is so intractable as to defy
remediation.
See, e.g., United States v. Benoit, 713 F.3d 1, 9 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that the government
had not instigated search of defendant's computer by his girlfriend); United States v. Inman, 558 F.3d
742, 745 (8th Cir. 2009) (considering 'whether the citizen acted at the government's request"); United
States v. Dahlstrom, 180 F.3d 677, 682 (5th Cir. 1999) (considering whether the individual initiated the
idea "on his own").

" See United States v. Lambert, 771 F.2d 83, 89 (6th Cir. 1985) ("[The housekeeper] was told on
several occasions that she should not take items from the house.").
" See United States v. Ginglen, 467 F.3d 1071, 1075 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that a lack of
"reward" was a factor in the court's determination); Daldstrom, 180 F.3d at 682 (stating that
compensation is a factor to consider).
2" See United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[The government] had
certainly encouraged [the private party] to engage in this type of search.").
'o United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1987).
261Id.at 740.
262See id.
13

United States v.Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2003).

65See id. at 341.
265Id. at
343.
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Jarrett involved a prosecution for the manufacture and receipt of child
pornography, and the court held that the same anonymous computer hacker who
266
had provided information that led to the conviction in United States v. Steige
had not acted as a government agent when he subsequently searched Jarrett's
computer.167 The defense had argued, and the district court had agreed, that
extensive e-mail messages between the hacker, referred to as Unknownuser, and
law enforcement authorities during and after the Steiger prosecution had
constituted sufficient encouragement for the search to be attributable to the
government.2 6 The Fourth Circuit's examination of the language, timing, and
significance of the communications was critical to its analysis of whether, in its
view, an "agency relationship" had developed between Unknownuser and the
government.

269

In his searches of both Steiger's and Jarrett's computers, Unknownuser, who
was in Turkey and remained anonymous throughout, gained access through a
Trojan Horse program that he "attached to a picture he posted to a news group
frequented by pornography enthusiasts."27 When downloaded, the program
271
allowed Unknownuser to enter the receiving computer and examine its contents.
As noted above, evidence of child pornography was discovered on Steiger's
computer, and it was forwarded to the police.272 In late 2000, after Steiger was
indicted, FBI Special Agent James Duffy, attach6 for the FBI in Turkey, contacted
Unknownuser by both e-mail and phone.27 3 In these communications, Duffy told
Unknownuser that he would not be prosecuted for his assistance, unsuccessfully
sought a meeting, and posed questions "with the hope that Unknownuser would
reveal his identity and perhaps agree to testify at Steiger's trial."274 Significantly, in
an e-mail "Duffy closed this exchange . . . by thanking Unknownuser for his
assistance and stating that 'If you want to bring other information forward, I am
available."' 275 Agent Duffy again contacted Unknownuser by e-mail five months
later, informing him of a trial postponement, thanking him again, and reiterating
that Unknownuser would not be prosecuted "should he decide to serve
as a
27
witness. " 2 6 Unknownuser again stated that he would not reveal his identity.
266United

States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1045 (11th Cir. 2003). See supra notes 85-88 and

accompanying text.
267Jarretr,388 F.3d at 340-41.
261Id. at 341-43.
269Id. at 345-46.
270Id. at 341.
271Id.

27 United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1041-42 (11th Cir. 2003).
27
3Jarretr,388 F.3d at 341.
274Id.

275Id.
276
277

Id.
Id.
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The next contact between Unknownuser and law enforcement was
approximately seven months later, "when Unknownuser sent an unsolicited email
to his contact at the Montgomery, Alabama Police Department."27 He informed
the officer there that "he had 'found another child molester.'"279 This allegation
concerned Jarrett. 28 0 Unknownuser sent e-mails and attached files collected from

Jarrett's computer to the Montgomery officer, who forwarded them to the FBI.2 's
The FBI investigated and, after filing a criminal complaint, applied for and
executed a search warrant. 282 Jarrett was arrested, and shortly afterwards, on
December 16, 2001, Agent Duffy, who "was unaware of the Jarrett
investigation," 28 3 contacted Unknownuser to "inform[ ] him of Steiger's sentence
and [to thank] Unknownuser for his assistance in the case." 284 Unknownuser
replied, informing Duffy of the matter concerning Jarrett. 28 sHe inquired about that
investigation's progress, and "[asked] Agent Duffy to have Agent Margaret
Faulkner-a special agent based in Alabama who had been involved in the Steiger
investigation-contact

him."286

Agent

Duffy

then

replied

and

updated

Unknownuser about the matter, "and request[ed] that Unknownuser maintain
287
email contact with Agent Faulkner via her personal email address."
Jarrett was indicted, and he moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the
execution of the search warrant because the warrant had been issued based upon
the information provided by Unknownuser.2 ssThe motion was denied, and Jarrett
entered a conditional guilty plea to a single charge of manufacturing child
pornography. 2 9 Before sentencing, however, Jarrett moved for a reconsideration of
his motion to suppress on the basis of new evidence, which the government did not
disclose until after his guilty plea.29 ° The evidence consisted of "a series of emails
exchanged between Unknownuser and FBI agent Faulkner, beginning shortly after
Jarrett's arrest and extending for almost two months."291 The Fourth Circuit
characterized the exchange as follows:
In the initial email in this series, dated December 19, 2001,
Agent Faulkner explicitly thanked Unknownuser for providing
Id.at 341-42.

278

279Id. at 342.
0

81

Id.

2 Id.
282Id.

283Id.

2 Id.
28 See id.
28 6

Id.

287 Id.

2SId.
89

2 Id.
290

Id. at 342-43.
342.

291Id. at
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the information to law enforcement officials. She then engaged
in what can only be characterized as the proverbial "wink and a
nod":
I can not ask you to search out cases such as the ones you have
sent to us. That would make you an agent of the Federal
Government and make how you obtain your information illegal
and we could not use it against the men in the pictures you send.
But if you should happen across such pictures as the ones you
have sent to us and wish us to look into the matter, please feel
free to send them to us. We may have lots of questions and have
to email you with the questions. But as long as you are not
'hacking' at our request, we can take the pictures and identify the
men and take them to court. We also have no desire to charge
you with hacking. You are not a U.S. citizen and are not bound
by our laws.
Over the course of the next two months, Agent Faulkner sent at
least four additional email messages, which constituted, in the
words of the district court, a "pen-pal' type correspondence" with
Unknownuser. In addition to expressing gratitude and
admiration for Unknownuser, Faulkner repeatedly sought to
reassure Unknownuser that he was not a target of law
enforcement for his hacking activities.....
In his responses to Agent Faulkner, Unknownuser spoke freely of
his "hacking adventures" and suggested in no uncertain terms
that he would continue to search for child pornographers using
the same methods employed to identify Steiger and Jarrett. As
found by the district court, Agent Faulkner, despite her
knowledge of Unknownuser's illegal hacking, "never instruct[ed]
Unknownuser that he should cease hacking."292
The district court reversed its earlier ruling and suppressed the evidence
obtained pursuant to the warrant, and, deeming Jarrett's motion to reconsider as a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, granted that as well.2 9 It "reasoned that the
'totality of all the contact between law enforcement and Unknownuser
encourage[d] Unknownuser to continue his behavior and to remain in contact with

292

2

3

Id. at 343.
Id.
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the FBI."'294 The court concluded that the parties had "expressed their consent to
an agency relationship," 295 and held that the evidence obtained as a result of
Unknownuser's hacking was inadmissible. 9 6
The Court of Appeals disagreed, observing that the district court:
[C]oncluded that Unknownuser's extensive post-search email
exchange with Agent Faulkner, together with the brief exchanges
between Unknownuser and Agent Duffy in November and
December 2000 (one year prior to the Jarrett search) and May
2001 (seven months prior to the Jarrett search), demonstrated
that the Government had an "ongoing relationship" with
Unknownuser sufficient to make Unknownuser an agent of the
Government....
Although, as the Government conceded at oral argument, the
Faulkner email exchange probably does constitute the sort of
active Government participation sufficient to create an agency
relationship going forward (absent other countervailing facts), the
district court erred in relying on this exchange to find that the
Government knew of and acquiesced in the Jarrett search.297
The court stated that such reliance was misplaced because "Unknownuser's
email exchange with Faulkner took place after Unknownuser had hacked into
Jarrett's computer," and the fruits of that search had resulted in the issuance of the
warrant and Jarrett's arrest. 298 "Thus, Faulkner's knowledge and acquiescence was

entirely post-search. Such after-the-fact conduct cannot serve to transform the
prior relationship between Unknownuser and the Government into an agency
relationship with respect to the search of Jarrett's computer."299
With regard to Unknownuser's pre-search communications with Agent Duffy,
including Duff/s e-mail in December 2000 stating that "[i]f you want to bring
other information forward, I am available,"3" the court characterized them as
"brief," having taken place "seven to twelve months before the Jarrett search," and
consisting of
nothing more than perfunctory expressions of gratitude for
Unknownuser's assistance in the Steiger investigation, assurances
24

Id.

295 Id.

296
Id.
29'
29 id. at 346.
8Id.
2
" Id.
3m Id. at 341.
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that Unknownuser would not be prosecuted should he decide to
testify . . . and a vague offer of availability to receive more
information in the future. Without more, these exchanges do not
suffice to create an agency relationship that would embrace the
Jarrett search. 3'
While the court's concern with the suitability of proof concerning an "ongoing
relationship"30 2 was responsive to the framing of the issue by the district court, the
Fourth Circuit's derogation of the significance of Duffy's pre-search expression of
"availability to receive more information" 303 misses the point on the significance of
a "wink and a nod" form of encouragement. Far from being "vague," 30 4 or "too
remote in time and too tenuous in substance" 30 5 to constitute impermissible
encouragement, Duffy's statement, in and of itself, conveyed the necessary
information to Unknownuser concerning his freedom from constitutional
restraints. Once that genie was pulled from the bottle, no repetition was necessary
to reinforce Unknownuser's belief that he was free to act and that a governmental
sanctioning of similar searches awaited him.
The "wink and a nod" is not an unapproachable problem. It targets and
threatens the core values of the Fourth Amendment, with its parameters upon
governmental intrusion. The practice may appear in language that is brazen or in a
form that is subtle enough to prompt an appellate court's conclusion that it is
"brief' or "vague." In whatever form, it should be squarely addressed with a policy
that holds that, whenever a governmental official makes a reference or statement to
a private party concerning that party's ability to search or seize free of constitutional
or other legal constraints, that will be deemed encouragement for state action
purposes.
B. The PrivateParty'sMotivation
Under the suggested sequential approach, when it has been determined that the
state has participated in, instigated, or encouraged a private party's search and that
the private party has exceeded the boundaries established by the Fourth
Amendment, the presumption that the evidence must be suppressed would be
301Id. at 346.
30 Id. Jarretthas been criticized for the narrowness of its view in evaluating the relationship. See
Andres A. Mufloz, Comment, United States v. Jarrett, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 411, 411-12 (2004).
For advocacy of a statutory remedy for the actions of private computer hackers, see Monica R, Shah,
Note, The Case for a Statutory Suppression Remedy to Regulate Illegal Private Party Searches in
Cyberspace, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 250 (2005).
303
jarrett,338 F.3d at 346.
3 Id.
300Id. at 347.
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rebuttable by a showing that a private party's independent purpose had motivated
the search. The fashioning of an appropriate standard of proof for rebuttal should
be informed by the Supreme Court's discussion of the inevitable discovery doctrine
in Nix v. Williams,30 6 since the restructuring of the state action inquiry to
independently inquire into a countervailing private motivation appears to implicate
parallel concerns. In Nix, when first implementing the doctrine in the context of a
Sixth Amendment violation, the Court found that "[i]f the prosecution can
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the [unconstitutionally obtained
evidence] ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means,...
the deterrence rationale [of the exclusionary rule] has so little basis that the
evidence should be received."3" 7 The issue of the standard of proof was expressly
debated among the justices. In his dissent, Justice Brennan unsuccessfully argued
that this "hypothetical finding" required a heightened standard of clear and
convincing evidence "to protect fully the fundamental rights served by the
exclusionary rule."308 In the instant context, quite apart from avoiding the anomaly
of employing the higher criterion, requiring the conscientious application of a
preponderance of the evidence standard would appear to be sufficient to protect
Fourth Amendment interests in rebutting the presumption of exclusion.
The true challenge in addressing arguably countervailing private party
motivations would be in the maintenance of the appropriate focus of any such
inquiry. The Ninth Circuit recently articulated the issue succinctly- "Police officers
may not avoid the requirements of the Fourth Amendment by inducing, coercing,
promoting, or encouraging private parties to perform searches they would not
otherwise perform.""9 The question of whether the specific search at issue would
have been undertaken by the private party is absolutely critical to the matter of
whether the private party's motivation can preclude the exclusion of the evidence.
In examining the private motivation, the possibility of a court's framing the issue
only in terms of the generalized authority of a private actor is always present. The
current totality of the circumstances approach can obscure the importance of this
refined inquiry, and the suggested restructured analysis would serve to crystallize a
court's consideration of the proper issue to be considered.
This sort of error was evident under the currently prevalent approach in the
Eighth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Smith.310 In Smith, a "police officer..
. who was participating in a 'parcel interdiction' operation at a Federal Express ...
facility ... removed a suspicious looking package from a conveyor belt."3 ' She then
gave it to Detective Catano, who submitted it to a canine sniff that indicated the

See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441-43 (1984).

307Id. at 444.

Id. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
George v. Edholm, 752 F.3d 1206, 1215 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added).
310See United States v. Smith, 383 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2004).
311Id. at 703.
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presence of drugs.312 At that point, the detective "took the package to Lee
Edwards, the FedEx facility manager, and told her that the suspected package
contained drugs. Edwards asked whether Catano wanted her to open the package.
Detective Catano testified that he told her that 'if she wanted to open it that would
be fine.'

313

The manager opened the package, discovered a substance, which

proved to be cocaine, and the package was taken by the police, resealed at the
police station and a controlled delivery to the defendant was arranged. 314 At
defendant's trial for drug possession, his motion to suppress the cocaine was denied
by the district court.

315

Examining both Walther-Miller factors, the court first concluded that "the
government's knowledge and acquiescence, when considered in light of Catano's
communication to Edwards that the decision was hers alone to make, did not make
Edwards a government agent."316 With regard to the issue of the manager's
motivation, the court stated:
With respect to the question of intent, the district court found
that Edwards's decision to inspect the package, even if
accompanied by a dual motive of assisting the officers, was
motivated by her obligation to ensure that her employer was not
being used as a means of carrying contraband. As the Supreme
Court has pointed out, a commercial carrier such as FedEx has a
"duty to refrain from carrying contraband," and such a carrier's
employees may act to ensure compliance with that duty. That a
private citizen is motivated in part by a desire to aid law
enforcement does not in and of itself transform her into a
government agent.

317

In Smith, the Eighth Circuit simply did not address the issue of whether the
manager's search would have been performed had it not been for the police's
singling out of the package, employing a canine search, and conveying it to her.
Although Smith's inadequate analysis is not a frequently occurring error among the
opinions of the Courts of Appeals,31 the suggested sequential approach would
Id.

312

313Id.
314Id.

Id.

315

Id. at 705.

316

317Id. (citation omitted). The authority citing a carrier's "duty to refrain from carrying contraband,"
I11inois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 769 n.1 (1983), did not, of course, address a carrier's inspection of a
package that had been identified by police. See id. at 766-68.
318For an excellent example of a case that quite properly examines the issue of whether a particular
search occurred as a result of a private motivation, see United States v. Howard, 752 F.2d 220 (6th Cir.
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provide specificity to the inquiry concerning rebuttal of a presumption of
suppression that would go far in preventing such a loss of focus.
CONCLUSION

The suggested restructuring of the circuits' current multi-factored totality of the
circumstances approaches will sacrifice nothing with regard to an appellate court's
ability to examine those matters which are now viewed as critical to a
determination of state action in the context of private party searches. The suggested
approach will underline the importance of an examination of governmental
encouragement as the focus of the inquiry. Clarifying the process by requiring a
separate examination of each issue in detail, it will help to avoid the distorting
influence of private motivation upon a judicial assessment of governmental
involvement. Unlike the current unitary mode of inquiry, this structured approach
would also leave no doubt about the weight to be afforded to a dearly identifiable,
independent private motivation for the search at issue. Most importantly, in
providing encouragement for judicial rigor in examining each of these
considerations, the suggested approach will maximize the capacity of judicial
evaluation to supply much-needed guidance for law enforcement concerning the
boundaries of permissible govemmental activity in this critical area of the law.

1985) (discussing an insurance investigator who was on premises to determine the liability of the
insurance company).

